In G. Currie, P. Kotatko & M. Pokorny (eds.), Mimesis: Metaphysics, Cognition, Pragmatics. College Publications (2012)

Authors
Mark Sainsbury
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
The paper focuses on two apparent paradoxes arising from our use of intensional verbs: first, their object can be something which does not exist, i.e. something which is nothing; second, the fact that entailment from a qualified to a non-qualified object is not guaranteed. In this paper, I suggest that the problems share a solution, insofar as they arise in connection with intensional verbs that ascribe mental states. The solution turns on (I) a properly intensional or nonrelational notion of representation and (II) a notion of “putting a representation on display”.
Keywords Nonexistence  Intensionality  Propositional attitudes
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Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1985 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Truth and Meaning.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):304-323.
Reference Without Referents.R. M. Sainsbury (ed.) - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.

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