Representing unicorns: how to think about intensionality

In G. Currie, P. Kotatko & M. Pokorny (eds.), Mimesis: Metaphysics, Cognition, Pragmatics. College Publications (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The paper focuses on two apparent paradoxes arising from our use of intensional verbs: first, their object can be something which does not exist, i.e. something which is nothing; second, the fact that entailment from a qualified to a non-qualified object is not guaranteed. In this paper, I suggest that the problems share a solution, insofar as they arise in connection with intensional verbs that ascribe mental states. The solution turns on (I) a properly intensional or nonrelational notion of representation and (II) a notion of “putting a representation on display”.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Paradoxes of intensionality.Dustin Tucker & Richmond H. Thomason - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (3):394-411.
Intensionality and Intentionality.Stephen F. Barker - 1982 - Philosophy Research Archives 8:95-109.
Tropes, Intensional Relative Clauses, and the Notion of a Variable Object.Friederike Moltmann - 2012 - In Aloni Maria, Kimmelman Vadim, Weidman Sassoon Galit, Roloefson Floris, Schulz Katrin & Westera Matthjis (eds.), Proceedings of the 18th Amsterdam Colloquium 2011. Springer.
Alethic Statements Are Not Intensional.Ari Maunu - 2006 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):53-61.
Intentionality and intensionality.James W. Cornman - 1962 - Philosophical Quarterly 12 (January):44-52.
Not All Attitudes are Propositional.Alex Grzankowski - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy (3):374-391.
The Intensional Many - Conservativity Reclaimed.Harald Andreas Bastiaanse - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (5):883-901.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-09-11

Downloads
474 (#22,517)

6 months
18 (#59,858)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mark Sainsbury
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1985 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
Truth and meaning.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):304-323.

View all 10 references / Add more references