Oxford University Press (2012)

Authors
Michael Tye
University of Texas at Austin
R. Mark Sainsbury
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
Sainsbury and Tye present a new theory, 'originalism', which provides natural, simple solutions to puzzles about thought that have troubled philosophers for centuries. They argue that concepts are to be individuated by their origin, rather than epistemically or semantically. Although thought is special, no special mystery attaches to its nature.
Keywords Thought and thinking  Frege cases  Paderewski example  Transparency  Perception
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Call number BD161.S25 2012
ISBN(s) 9780199695317
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Representation in Cognitive Science.Nicholas Shea - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
Perception and Ordinary Objects.Alex Byrne - 2019 - In Javier Cumpa & Bill Brewer (eds.), The Nature of Ordinary Objects. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
What Acquaintance Teaches.Alex Grzankowski & Michael Tye - forthcoming - In Thomas Raleigh & Jonathan Knowles (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
The Vagueness Argument Against Abstract Artifacts.Daniel Z. Korman - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):57-71.
I—R. M. Sainsbury and Michael Tye: An Originalist Theory of Concepts.R. M. Sainsbury & Michael Tye - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):101-124.

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