Idea, Judgement and Will: Essays on the Theory of Judgement

Dissertation, Turun Yliopisto (Finland) (1983)

The book deals with two questions: What is the difference between entertaining and believing ? Can the state of belief be produced at will? ;In the first part I trace one historical line of development, from Aristotle to Brentano, in the attempts to answer the question . I consider first the views of Aristotle, Aquinas and Locke who seem to think that the difference is one of object, and second the views of Hume and Brentano who attacked this traditional theory. I also consider two objections to Brentano and the unwelcome consequences of Brentano's non-propositional theory of judgement. ;In the second part I give the negative answer to the question after examining Descartes's and Spinoza's opposite views of the voluntariness of believing. I also deal with, and reject, five suggested methods of acquiring beliefs at will: those of Leibniz, Newman, James, Winters and Stocker. Moreover, I argue that the view that believing is not voluntary does not entail that beliefs are non-rational
Keywords Belief and doubt   Judgment
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ISBN(s) 9516423426
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