On the Division Between Reason and Unreason in Kant

Human Studies 32 (2):201-223 (2009)
This article examines Kant’s discussion of the division between reason and unreason in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View . On the one hand, Kant says that there is a normative, clear, and definite division between reason and unreason. On the other hand, Kant offers three arguments showing that we cannot draw such a division. First, we cannot explain the normative grounds for the division. Second, both reason and unreason are present in everyone to varying degrees in different ways. Third, Kant invalidates the division as such by characterizing what should be more incomprehensible than an extreme case of unreason as also being a rational way of life.
Keywords Kant  Reason  Rule-following  Unreason
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DOI 10.1007/s10746-009-9119-z
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Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.
The Metaphysics of Morals.Immanuel Kant - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.

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