Being one of us. Group identification, joint actions, and collective intentionality

Philosophical Psychology 33 (1):42-63 (2020)
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1. Philosophical arguments (Schweikard & Schmid, 2013) and empirical evidence (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005) support the idea that the capacity to engage in joint actions is a ke...



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Author Profiles

Alessandro Salice
University College Cork
Kengo Miyazono
Hokkaido University