Being of Two Minds: Belief with Doubt

Noûs 29 (1):1-20 (1995)
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Nathan Salmón
University of California, Santa Barbara

Citations of this work

Why Suspend Judging?Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):302-326.
Suspended judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.
Understanding belief reports.David Braun - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.
Propositional attitude reports.Thomas McKay - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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Indefinite descriptions: In defense of Russell. [REVIEW]Peter Ludlow & Stephen Neale - 1991 - Linguistics and Philosophy 14 (2):171 - 202.

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