Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (1):3-25 (2015)
AbstractWe present an inferentialist account of collective rationality and intentionality, according to which beliefs and other intentional states are understood in terms of the normative statuses attributed to, and undertaken by, the participants of a discursive practice—namely, their discursive or practical commitments and entitlements. Although these statuses are instituted by the performances and attitudes of the agents, they are not identified with any physical or psychological entity, process or relation. Therefore, we argue that inferentialism allows us to talk of collective intentionality and agency without needing to posit the existence of any sort of collective psychology or mind
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency.Michael E. Bratman - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.
The Construction of Social Reality. Anthony Freeman in Conversation with John Searle.J. Searle & A. Freeman - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (2):180-189.
Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism.Robert Brandom - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work
Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons.Matteo Bianchin - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5):442-461.
Individual and Collective Intentionality: Elaborating the Fundamentality-Question.Patrizio Ulf Enrico Lo Presti - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (4):1977-1997.
Whose Purposes? Biological Teleology and Intentionality.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4507-4524.
Inferentialism, Degrees of Commitment, and Ampliative Reasoning.Rodríguez Xavier de Donato, Bonilla Jesús Zamora & Javier González De Prado Salas - forthcoming - Synthese:1-19.
Similar books and articles
Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality.Bryce Huebner - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA.
From Moral Agency to Collective Wrongs: Re-Thinking Collective Moral Responsibility.Marion Smiley - 2010 - Journal of Law and Policy (1):171-202.
Group Mind.Georg Theiner & Wilson Robert - 2013 - In Byron Kaldis (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences. Sage Publications. pp. 401-04.
Collective Intentionality, Evolutionary Biology and Social Reality.Jack Vromen - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):251-265.
The Conditions of Collectivity: Joint Commitment and the Shared Norms of Membership.Titus Stahl - 2014 - In Anita Konzelmann Ziv & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Springer. pp. 229-244.
Beyond the Big Four and the Big Five.Frank Hindriks, Sara Rachel Chant & Gerhard Preyer - 2014 - In Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), From Individual to Collective Intentionality. pp. 1-9.
Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings.Margaret Gilbert - 2002 - The Journal of Ethics 6 (2):115-143.
The Argument From Normative Autonomy for Collective Agents.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - Journal of Social Philosophy 38 (3):410–427.