Dialectica 65 (1):1-29 (2011)

Abstract
Perceptual theories of emotion purport to avoid the problems of traditional cognitivism and noncognitivism by modelling emotion on perception, which shares the most conspicuous dimensions of emotion, intentionality and phenomenality. In this paper, I shall reconstrue and discuss four key arguments that perceptual theorists have presented in order to show that emotion is a kind of perception, or that there are close analogies between emotion and perception. These arguments are, from stronger to weaker claims: the perceptual system argument; the argument from noninferential structure; the argument from epistemic role; and the argument from phenomenology. I argue that, while the arguments in favour of assimilating emotion to perception fail, the analogies between emotion and perception are not as close as perceptual theorists suggest even if some emotions resemble perception more than others, thanks to the two-levelled structure of emotional processing
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01259.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 55,909
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.

View all 59 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Emotions as Attitudes.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (3):293-311.
Emotion.Ronald de Sousa - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Are Emotions Perceptions of Value?Jérôme Dokic & Stéphane Lemaire - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):227-247.
Epistemic Perceptualism and Neo-Sentimentalist Objections.Robert Cowan - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):59-81.

View all 27 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Standing Up for an Affective Account of Emotion.Demian Whiting - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):261-276.
Self-Deception About Emotion.Lisa Damm - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):254-270.
True Emotions.Mikko Salmela - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):382-405.
Emotion Experience and its Varieties.Nico H. Frijda - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):264-271.
Perceptual Symbol Systems and Emotion.Louis C. Charland - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):612-613.
Why Does Music Move Us?Björn Vickhoff & Helge Malmgren - 2004 - Philosophical Communications.
Feeling is Perceiving: Core Affect and Conceptualization in the Experience of Emotion.Lisa Feldman Barrett - 2005 - In Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. Niedenthal & Piotr Winkielman (eds.), Emotion and Consciousness. Guilford Press. pp. 255-284.
Explaining Action by Emotion.Sabine A. Döring - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):214-230.
Emotion-Specific Clues to the Neural Substrate of Empathy.Anthony P. Atkinson - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):22-23.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-02-23

Total views
182 ( #51,274 of 2,402,079 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #257,447 of 2,402,079 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes