Causality without counterfactuals

Philosophy of Science 61 (2):297-312 (1994)
This paper presents a drastically revised version of the theory of causality, based on analyses of causal processes and causal interactions, advocated in Salmon (1984). Relying heavily on modified versions of proposals by P. Dowe, this article answers penetrating objections by Dowe and P. Kitcher to the earlier theory. It shows how the new theory circumvents a host of difficulties that have been raised in the literature. The result is, I hope, a more satisfactory analysis of physical causality
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DOI 10.1086/289801
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Stuart Glennan (2002). Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation. Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S342-353.
Stuart Glennan (2002). Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation. Philosophy of Science 69 (S3):S342-S353.

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