Mind 128 (510):397-427 (2019)
AbstractEpistemologists have recently noted a tension between (i) denying access internalism, and (ii) maintaining that rational agents cannot be epistemically akratic, believing claims akin to ‘p, but I shouldn’t believe p’. I bring out the tension, and develop a new way to resolve it. The basic strategy is to say that access internalism is false, but that counterexamples to it are ‘elusive’ in a way that prevents rational agents from suspecting that they themselves are counterexamples to the internalist principles. I argue that this allows us to do justice to the motivations behind both (i) and (ii). And I explain in some detail what a view of evidence that implements this strategy, and makes it independently plausible, might look like.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Citations of this work
Deference Done Better.Kevin Dorst, Benjamin A. Levinstein, Bernhard Salow, Brooke E. Husic & Branden Fitelson - 2021 - Wiley: Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):99-150.
Does rationality demand higher-order certainty?Mattias Skipper - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11561-11585.
Similar books and articles
Reconciling Justificatory Internalism and Content Externalism.Chris Tillman - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):419-440.
Meta-Externalism Vs Meta-Internalism in the Study of Reference.Daniel Cohnitz & Jussi Haukioja - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):475-500.
Good Advice and Rational Action.Eric Wiland - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):561-569.
On the Compatibility of Epistemic Internalism and Content Externalism.B. J. C. Madison - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (3):173-183.
Making Sense: The Epistemology of Semantic Externalism.Laura Bugge Schroeter - 1999 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
Internalism, Externalism and Epistemic Defeat.Michael Abram Bergmann - 1997 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
Stained Glass as a Model for Consciousness.Mihnea D. I. Capraru - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):90-103.
Internalism and Externalism in Speech Act Theory.Robert Harnish - 2009 - Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 5 (1):9-31.
Weak Inferential Internalism is Indistinguishable From Externalism: A Reply to Rhoda.David Alexander - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 37:387-394.
Weak Inferential Internalism is Indistinguishable From Externalism – A Reply to Rhoda.David Alexander - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 37:387-394.