Ridgeview (1986)

Authors
Nathan Salmon
University of California at Santa Barbara
Abstract
The nature of the information content of declarative sentences is a central topic in the philosophy of language. The natural view that a sentence like "John loves Mary" contains information in which two individuals occur as constituents is termed the naive theory, and is one that has been abandoned by most contemporary scholars. This theory was refuted originally by philosopher Gottlob Frege. His argument that the naive theory did not work is termed Frege's puzzle, and his rival account of information content is termed the orthodox theory. In this detailed study, Nathan Salmon defends a version of the naive theory and presents a proposal for its extension that provides a better picture of information content than the orthodox theory gives. He argues that a great deal of what has generally been taken for granted in the philosophy of language over the past few decades is either mistaken or unsupported, and consequently, much current research is focused on the wrong set of questions. Salmon dissolves Frege's puzzle as it is usually formulated and demonstrates how it can be reconstructed and strengthened to yield a more powerful objection to the naive theory. He then defends the naive theory against the new Frege puzzle by presenting an idea that yields both a surprisingly rich and powerful extension of the naive theory and a better picture of information content than that of the original orthodox theory. Nathan Salmon is Professor of Philosophy, University of California at Santa Barbara. A Bradford Book.
Keywords Frege, Gottlob   Semantics
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 1987
Buy this book Find it on Amazon.com
ISBN(s) 0262192462   0262192462   0262690969
DOI 10.2307/2185233
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 59,759
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap.Joseph Levine - 1983 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.
Mental Files.François Recanati - 2012 - Oxford University Press.

View all 285 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Frege's Puzzle About the Cognitive Function of Truth.Dirk Greimann - 2004 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):425-442.
A Pragmatic Solution to Ostertag’s Puzzle.Philip Atkins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):359-365.
Can Frege Pose Frege's Puzzle?Stavroula Glezakos - 2009 - In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 202.
Conventions and Coreferentiality.Rod Bertolet - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Research 19:257-262.
Frege's Puzzle.Nathan Solomon - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing About Language. Routledge.
Names, Sense and Kripke’s Puzzle.Tim Crane - 1992 - From the Logical Point of View 2:11-26.
Frege’s Distinction Between Sense and Reference.Gideon Makin - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (2):147-163.
Frege Puzzles?Joseph Almog - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (6):549 - 574.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-04-06

Total views
322 ( #26,384 of 2,432,579 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
19 ( #39,038 of 2,432,579 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes