Philosophy of Science 44 (2):179-185 (1977)

Carl G. Hempel has often stated that inductive-statistical explanations, as he conceives them, are inductive arguments. This discussion note raises the question of whether such arguments are to be understood as (1) arguments of the traditional sort, containing premises and conclusions, governed by some sort of inductive "acceptance rules," or (2) something more closely akin to Carnap's degree of confirmation statements which occur in an inductive logic which entirely eschews inductive "acceptance rules." Hempel's writings do not seem unequivocal on this issue. It is suggested that adoption of construal (2) would remove the need for Hempel's high probability requirement on I-S explanations
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DOI 10.1086/288735
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Philosophy of Natural Science.Carl G. Hempel - 1967 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):70-72.
Statistical Explanation.Wesley C. Salmon - 1970 - In Robert Colodny (ed.), The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 173--231.
Inductive Inconsistencies.Carl Gustav Hempel - 1960 - Synthese 12 (4):439-69.

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