Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):99 - 122 (1991)
Reichenbach sought to resolve Hume's problem of the justification of induction by means of a pragmatic vindication that relies heavily on the convergence properties of his rule of induction. His attempt to rule out all other asymptotic methods by an appeal to descriptive simplicity was unavailing. We found that important progress in that direction could be made by invoking normalizing conditions (consistency) and methodological simplicity (as a basis for invariance), but that they did not do the whole job. I am proposing that, in the end, Reichenbach's own distinction between discovery and justification holds the key to the solution
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Citations of this work BETA
How Are Basic Belief-Forming Methods Justified?Enoch David & Schechter Joshua - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):547–579.
Can There Be a Discipline of Philosophy? And Can It Be Founded on Intuitions?Ernest Sosa - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (4):453-467.
The Co-Discovery of Conservation Laws and Particle Families.Oliver Schulte - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 39 (2):288-314.
Reichenbach's Posits Reposited.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (1):93 - 108.
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