Philosophia (1):1-13 (2013)
AbstractRecent years have seen increasing attacks on the "deontological" conception (or as we call it, the guidance conception) of epistemic justification, the view that epistemology offers advice to knowers in forming beliefs responsibly. Critics challenge an important presupposition of the guidance conception: doxastic voluntarism, the view that we choose our beliefs. We assume that epistemic guidance is indispensable, and seek to answer objections to doxastic voluntarism, most prominently William Alston's. We contend that Alston falsely assumes that choice of belief requires the assent to a specific propositional content. We argue that beliefs can be chosen under descriptions which do not specify their propositional content, but instead specify the mental actions by which they are formed and maintained. We argue that these actions partially constitute the beliefs and that is it in virtue of resulting from and being partially constituted by such actions that the beliefs are subject to epistemic appraisal
Similar books and articles
Rationalizing Beliefs: Evidential Vs. Pragmatic Reasons.Hamid Vahid - 2010 - Synthese 176 (3):447-462.
Empirical Content and Rational Constraint.Cheryl K. Chen - 2006 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):242 – 264.
Nondescriptivist Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethic.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2000 - Philosophical Papers 29 (2):121-153.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
A Role for Abstractionism in a Direct Realist Foundationalism.Benjamin Bayer - 2011 - Synthese 180 (3):357-389.
The Elusiveness of Doxastic Compatibilism.Benjamin Bayer - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (3):233-252.
References found in this work
The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception: Classic Edition.James J. Gibson - 1979 - Houghton Mifflin.
Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.Robert Brandom - 1994 - Harvard University Press.
Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge.Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - 1996 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.