Prometeus: Filosofia em Revista 33: 231-255 (2020)

Sagid Salles
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (PhD)
I have two main goals in this paper. First, I develop a version of Theory of Identification for the reference of proper names, one which comes from Strawson and Evans. The theory is not developed in detail, but its central elements are revealed, focusing on its treatment of the phenomenon of reference borrowing. At the center of this theory is Russell’s Principle which, applied to the reference of proper names, states that the identification of the named object is a necessary condition for the success of reference. Secondly, I reply to the challenge posed by the semantic argument inspired by Kripke and Donnellan. This argument can be used to show that identification is not necessary for the success of reference. I defend that it is not effective against the version of Theory of Identification advocated here.
Keywords Proper Names  Reference Borrowing  Identification  Russell’s Principle  Semantic Argument
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References found in this work BETA

Putnam’s Paradox.David K. Lewis - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):221 – 236.
Reference Without Referents.R. M. Sainsbury (ed.) - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Proper Names and Practices: On Reference Without Referents.Mark Textor - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):105-118.
Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.

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