On vindicating induction

Philosophy of Science 30 (3):252-261 (1963)
This paper deals with the problem of vindicating a particular type of inductive rule, a rule to govern inferences from observed frequencies to limits of relative frequencies. Reichenbach's rule of induction is defended. By application of two conditions, normalizing conditions and a criterion of linguistic invariance, it is argued that alternative rules lead to contradiction. It is then argued that the rule of induction does not lead to contradiction when suitable restrictions are placed upon the predicates admitted. Goodman's grue-bleen paradox is considered, and an attempt to resolve it is offered. Finally, Reichenbach's pragmatic argument, hinging on convergence properties, is applied
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DOI 10.1086/287939
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Inference, Practice and Theory.F. John Clendinnen - 1977 - Synthese 34 (1):89 - 132.
Scientific Explanation: A Critical Survey. [REVIEW]Gerhard Schurz - 1995 - Foundations of Science 1 (3):429-465.

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