Reasoning in the social sciences

Synthese 97 (2):249 - 267 (1993)
Abstract
In 1981, A. C. Crombie identified six “styles of scientific thinking in the European tradition” that constitute our ways of reasoning in the natural sciences. In this paper, I try to show that these styles constitute reasoning in the social sciences as well, and that, as a result, the differences between reasoning about the physical world and about human beings are not so different as some interpretevists have supposed
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