The Appraisal of Theories: Kuhn Meets Bayes

Abstract
This paper claims that adoption of Bayes's theorem as the schema for the appraisal of scientific theories can greatly reduce the distance between Kuhnians and logical empiricists. It is argued that plausibility considerations, which Kuhn considered outside of the logic of science, can be construed as prior probabilities, which play an indispensable role in the logic of science. Problems concerning likelihoods, especially the likelihood on the "catchall," are also considered. Severe difficulties concerning the significance of this probability arise in the evaluation of individual theories, but they can be avoided by restricting our judgments to comparative assessments of competing theories.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 33,167
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

On Correspondence.Stephan Hartmann - 2000 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 33 (1):79-94.
Decision Theory and Cognitive Choice.John R. Welch - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):147-172.
Curve-Fitting for Bayesians?Gordon Belot - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (3):689-702.
New Tools for Theory Choice and Theory Diagosis.John R. Welch - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):318-329.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Did Tom Kuhn Actually Meet Tom Bayes?Lefteris Farmakis - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (1):41 - 53.
Realism, Empiricism and Scientific Revolutions.Patrick Enfield - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (3):468-485.
Bayes' Theorem.James Joyce - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Reason, Judgement and Bayes's Law.Harold I. Brown - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (3):351-369.
Heisenberg Meets Kuhn: Closed Theories and Paradigms.Alisa Bokulich - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (1):90-107.
Kuhn, Nominalism, and Empiricism.Alexander Bird - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (4):690-719.
Normal Science and the Extension of Theories.Jack C. Carloye - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (3):241-256.
Incommensurability.Harold I. Brown - 1983 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):3 – 29.
The Spell of Kuhn on Psychology: An Exegetical Elixir.William O'Donohue - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (3):267 – 287.
Draft.Howard Sankey - manuscript
Reading The.Andy Pickering - 2001 - Perspectives on Science 9 (4).
Bayes's Theorem.Richard Swinburne - 2008 - Gogoa 8 (1):138.
Multisemiosis and Incommensurability.S. K. Arun Murthi & Sundar Sarukkai - 2009 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (3):297-311.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-05-29

Total downloads
32 ( #186,051 of 2,242,262 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #410,280 of 2,242,262 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature