Philosophy of Science 32 (2):137-146 (1965)
A consideration of some basic problems that arise in the attempt to provide an adequate characterization of statistical explanation is taken to show that an understanding of the nature of scientific explanation requires us to deal with the philosophical problems connected with the nature of prior probabilities
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Scientific Explanation: A Critical Survey. [REVIEW]Gerhard Schurz - 1995 - Foundations of Science 1 (3):429-465.
Similar books and articles
Contrastive, Non-Probabilistic Statistical Explanations.Bruce Glymour - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (3):448-471.
On a Recent Argument for the Impossibility of a Statistical Explanation of Single Events, and a Defence of a Modified Form of Hempel's Theory of Statistical Explanation.Colin Howson - 1988 - Erkenntnis 29 (1):113 - 124.
Determinism and Chance.B. Loewer - 2001 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 32 (4):609-620.
Causal Modeling: New Directions for Statistical Explanation.Gurol Irzik & Eric Meyer - 1987 - Philosophy of Science 54 (4):495-514.
Statistical Explanation & Statistical Relevance.Wesley C. Salmon - 1971 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
Comments on 'Hempel's Ambiguity' by J. Alberto Coffa.Wesley C. Salmon - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):165 - 169.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads24 ( #208,483 of 2,158,366 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #194,528 of 2,158,366 )
How can I increase my downloads?