The Stoics on Determinism and Compatibilism

Ashgate (2005)
Abstract
The basis of stoic determinism (a) : everything has a cause -- The basis of stoic determinism (b) : causation is necessitating -- The threat of external determination -- Reflection and responsibility -- The three compatibilist theories of Chrysippus -- Epictetus on responsibility for unreflective action.
Keywords Stoics  Free will and determinism
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Call number B528.S247 2005
ISBN(s) 0754639762   9780754639763
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Stoics Against Stoics In Cudworth's A Treatise of Freewill.John Sellars - 2012 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (5):935-952.

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