Van Inwagen and Gunk: A Response to Sider

Sorites 7:21-27 (1996)

Abstract
In a recent article, Theodore Sider raises an interesting objection to some of the ontological views of Peter van Inwagen. In van Inwagen's view, all material things are either mereological atoms or living things composed of such mereological atoms. Sider claims that it is possible for there to be worlds at which matter consists of atomless gunk. He argues that the possible existence of atomless gunk undermines van Inwagen's claims . I argue that the possible existence of atomless gunk does not undermine van Inwagen's position, and that Sider's claims concerning gunk are unwarranted
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