Abstract

In this paper I attempt to o f fer a concept of discretion and to an a l yse the forms of control that can be e x ercised in this matte r . F rom the concept of l e g al ce r taint y , w e can obse r v e h o w discretion eme r ges in those cases that are e n visaged b y the norms and in the so called hard cases. F requent l y it is maintained h o w e v e r , that, the on l y limit on discretion can be found in arbitrariness and that, apa r t from that, a n y decision w ould be co r rect. This could result in e xcluding discretiona r y decisions from l e gal control. A g ainst this opinion, there are authors that think that l e gal control of discretionary decisions is possi b le because th e y defend the e xistence of on l y one co r rect an sw e r . Other authors reject the e xistence of on l y one co r rect an sw er or the possibility of f inding it. N e v er theless, e v en accepting that there are some aspects of discretiona r y decisions that do not der i ve from l e gal no r ms bu t from personal preferences, those preferences must be coherent with some theo r y that contains no r mat i v e l y co r rect criteria. These criteria must be as coherent as possi b le with the dominant system of v alues in the socie t y