Why value values?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41 (2018)
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Abstract

Doris argues that an agent is responsible for her behavior only if that behavior expresses (a relevant subset of) the agent’s values. This view has problems explaining responsibility for mistakes or episodes of forgetfulness. These problems highlight a conceptual problem with Doris’s theory of responsible agency and give us reasons to prefer an alternative (non-valuational) theory of responsible agency.

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Samuel Murray
Providence College

Citations of this work

The nonmoral conditions of moral cognition.Bree Beal - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (8):1097-1124.

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References found in this work

Free agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.
Freedom within Reason.Gary Watson - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):890.
Responsibility and vigilance.Samuel Murray - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):507-527.
Slips.Santiago Amaya - 2011 - Noûs 47 (3):559-576.
Responsibility and rational abilities: Defending an asymmetrical view.Dana K. Nelkin - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):497-515.

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