Akrasia, instincts and revealed preferences

Synthese 181 (S1):1 - 17 (2011)
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Abstract

The standard economic theory of choice is extended to accommodate a particular form of akratic choice. The empirical content of the new theory is fully characterized. A characterization of revealed akratic choice, in terms of observable choice only, is also provided. These results are consistent with the viewpoint that akrasia is a concept that can be empirically substantiated

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References found in this work

How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?Donald Davidson - 1969 - In Joel Feinberg (ed.), Moral concepts. London,: Oxford University Press.
Akratic believing?Jonathan E. Adler - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (1):1 - 27.
Akratic Believers.Amelie Rorty - 1983 - American Philosophical Quarterly 20 (2):175-183.

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