Synthese 196 (9):3677-3695 (2019)

Alexander Sandgren
Umeå University
Geach points out that some pairs of beliefs have a common focus despite there being, apparently, no object at that focus. For example, two or more beliefs can be directed at Vulcan even though there is no such planet. Geach introduced the label ‘intentional identity’ to pick out the relation that holds between attitudes in these cases; Geach says that ’[w]e have intentional identity when a number of people, or one person on different occasions, have attitudes with a common focus, whether or not there actually is something at that focus’. In this paper, I propose a novel theory of intentional identity, the triangulation theory, and argue that it has considerable advantages over its principal rivals. My approach centers on agents’ metarepresentational beliefs about what it takes for intentional attitudes to be about particular objects.
Keywords Intentional Identity  Geach  Intentionality  Empty Names  Intentional Objects  Intentional Attitudes
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-017-1609-3
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References found in this work BETA

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Citations of this work BETA

Co‐Identification and Fictional Names.Manuel García‐Carpintero - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):3-34.
Turning Aboutness About.Alexander Sandgren - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
A New Puzzle for Phenomenal Intentionality.Peter Clutton & Alexander Sandgren - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
Private Investigators and Public Speakers.Alexander Sandgren - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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