Dissertatio:3-26 (2018)

Authors
César Schirmer Dos Santos
Federal University of Santa Maria
Abstract
Our question, in this paper, is about the plausibility of the expressivist account of one’s self- attribution of mental states. More to the point, we will strictly follow the principle of charity as a mean to show that an expressivist philosopher can have good and reasonable answers to the set of objections put together in so called “Geach’s point”. Using this method, we hope to give enough evidences that an expressivist philosopher has enough resources to build a plausible explanation for one’s attribution of mental states to herself.
Keywords Expressivism  Self-knowledge  Geach's point  Contextualism  Privileged access  Meaning
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Assertion.P. T. Geach - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.
What's Wrong with Contextualism?John Greco - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):416-436.
Self-Knowledge: The Wittgensteinian Legacy.Crispin Wright - 1998 - In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 101-122.
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations.Norman Malcolm - 1954 - Philosophical Review 63 (4):530-59.
Externalism and Modest Contextualism.Fred Dretske - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):173-186.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Peter Geach and “The Frege Point”.Roger M. White - 2015 - Philosophical Investigations 38 (1-2):133-149.
The Problem with the Frege–Geach Problem.Nate Charlow - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):635-665.
Are Expressivists Guilty of Wishful Thinking?Robert Mabrito - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1069-1081.
The Frege-Geach Problem.Jack Woods - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 226-242.
Geach and Ascriptivism: Beside the Point.Luís Duarte D'Almeida - 2016 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (6).
Expressing Credences.Daniel Rothschild - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):99-114.
Unity and the Frege–Geach Problem.Christopher Hom & Jeremy Schwartz - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):15-24.
Ascriptivism.P. T. Geach - 1960 - Philosophical Review 69 (2):221-225.
Nothing New in Ecumenia? Hare, Hybrid Expressivism and de Dicto Beliefs.Daniel Eggers - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (4):831-847.
Moral Inferentialism and the Frege-Geach Problem.Mark Douglas Warren - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2859-2885.
Geach on Generalization.Charles Sayward - 2002 - Dialogue 41 (2):221-.
Recent Work in Expressivism.Neil Sinclair - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):136-147.
Wittgenstein on “I Believe”.Wolfgang Freitag - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (1):54-69.
Assertion.P. T. Geach - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-03-05

Total views
510 ( #17,378 of 2,504,817 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
40 ( #22,293 of 2,504,817 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes