Begging the Question

Analysis 32 (6):197-199 (1972)
Abstract
A primary purpose of argument is to increase the degree of reasonable confidence that one has in the truth of the conclusion. A question begging argument fails this purpose because it violates what W. E. Johnson called an epistemic condition of inference. Although an argument of the sort characterized by Robert Hoffman in his response (Analysis 32.2, Dec 71) to Richard Robinson (Analysis 31.4, March 71) begs the question in all circumstances, we usually understand the charge that an argument is question begging with reference to the beliefs of the person, or the sort of person, to whom the argument is directed.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/analys/32.6.197
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 25,057
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Begging the Question.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):174 – 191.
Petitio Principii: What's Wrong?Andrea Iacona & Diego Marconi - 2005 - Facta Philosophica 7 (1):19-34.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Petitio Principii: What's Wrong?Andrea Iacona & Diego Marconi - 2005 - Facta Philosophica 7 (1):19-34.
Begging the Question.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):174 – 191.
Skepticism, Question Begging, and Burden Shifting.Paul K. Moser - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:209-217.
Begging the Question and Bayesians.Brian Weatherson - 1999 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 30:687-697.
Sketch for a Modal Interpretation of Descartes' Cogito.Michael R. Baumer - 1985 - Philosophy Research Archives 11:635-655.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-06-03

Total downloads

97 ( #49,268 of 2,126,928 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #201,338 of 2,126,928 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums