It is widely recognized that Kuhn and Feyerabend did not mean the same thing when they originally spoke of the incommensurability of competing theories. Feyerabend employed the term ‘incommensurability’ to refer to the absence of logical relations between theories due to semantic variance of the terms employed by theories. Kuhn employed the term to describe the obstacles to communication between advocates of rival paradigms which result from perceptual, methodological and semantic differences between paradigms. While Feyerabend’s use of the term remained constant throughout much of his writing on the topic, in his later work Kuhn developed a refined version of the notion of incommensurability which involved the inability to translate between holistically interdefined subsets of terms within the vocabulary of alternative theories.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Kuhn's Changing Concept of Incommensurability.Howard Sankey - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (4):759-774.
Incommensurability.Harold I. Brown - 1983 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):3 – 29.
Taxonomic Incommensurability.Howard Sankey - 1998 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (1):7 – 16.
Feyerabend and the Description Theory of Reference.Howard Sankey - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:223-232.
Paul Feyerabend Und Thomas Kuhn.Paul Hoyningen-Huene - 2002 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 33 (1):61-83.
Multisemiosis and Incommensurability.S. K. Arun Murthi & Sundar Sarukkai - 2009 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (3):297-311.
On the Historical Origins of the Contemporary Notion of Incommensurability: Paul Feyerabend's Assault on Conceptual Conservatism.Eric Oberheim - 2005 - Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 36 (2):363-90.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads26 ( #196,918 of 2,171,976 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #326,556 of 2,171,976 )
How can I increase my downloads?