Deﬂationism and truth
There is a line of argument which aims to show that certain ontological claims are harmless by making use of conservativity results. The argument goes back to Hilbert who set its general frame. Hilbert’s concern was with certain abstract (ideal) entities in mathematics but the argument has been applied without discrimination to avoid ontological commitment to abstract entities in physics (Field) or to avoid ontological commitment to semantical properties like truth (Shapiro).
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Minimalism, Deflationism, and Paradoxes.Michael Glanzberg - 2005 - In J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationism and Paradox. Clarendon Press.
Two Kinds of Ontological Commitment.Howard Peacock - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):79-104.
Deflationism and Gödel’s Theorem – a Comment on Gauker.Panu Raatikainen - 2002 - Analysis 62 (273):85–87.
Constructive Empiricism, Observability, and Three Kinds of Ontological Commitment.Gabriele Contessa - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 37 (4):454–468.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads11 ( #395,087 of 2,152,240 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?