Acta Analytica 21 (2):30-40 (2006)

Authors
Constantine Sandis
University of Hertfordshire
Abstract
This paper aims to explore the space of possible particularistic approaches to Philosophy of Science by examining the differences and similarities between Jonathan Dancy’s moral particularism—as expressed in both his earlier writings (e.g., Moral Reasons , 1993), and, more explicitly defended in his book Ethics without Principles (2004)—and Nancy Cartwright’s particularism in the philosophy of science, as defended in her early collection of essays, How the Laws of Physics Lie (1983), and her later book, The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science (1999). I shall argue that Dancy’s particularism is more radical, but also more plausible, than Cartwright’s, concluding that we have good reason to embrace a scientific particularism that is far closer to Dancy’s ethical particularism than any view defended by Nancy Cartwright, or any other philosopher from the ‘Stanford school’ of scientific theory.
Keywords particularism  philosophy of science  explanation  causation  Dancy  Cartwright  moral reasons
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-006-1002-1
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References found in this work BETA

Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
How the Laws of Physics Lie.Nancy Cartwright - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

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