Experience, memory and intelligence

The Monist 68 (4):507-521 (1985)

John T. Sanders
Rochester Institute of Technology
What characterizes most technical or theoretical accounts of memory is their reliance upon an internal storage model. Psychologists and neurophysiologists have suggested neural traces (either dynamic or static) as the mechanism for this storage, and designers of artificial intelligence have relied upon the same general model, instantiated magnetically or electronically instead of neurally, to do the same job. Both psychology and artificial intelligence design have heretofore relied, without much question, upon the idea that memory is to be understood as a matter of internal storage. In what follows, I shall first sketch the most important reasons for skepticism about this model, and I shall then propose an outline of an alternative way of talking about memory. This will provide an appropriate framework for suggesting a few implications for future work in artificial intelligence.
Keywords Experience  Intelligence  Memory  Metaphysics
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ISBN(s) 0026-9662
DOI 10.5840/monist19856847
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