Authors
Howard Sankey
University of Melbourne
Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between scepticism and epistemic relativism in the context of recent history and philosophy of science. More specifically, it seeks to show that significant treatments of epistemic relativism by influential figures in the history and philosophy of science draw upon the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. The paper begins with a presentation of the problem of the criterion as it occurs in the work of Sextus Empiricus. It is then shown that significant treatments of epistemic relativism in recent history and philosophy of science (critical rationalism, historical philosophy of science and the strong programme) draw upon the problem of the criterion. It is briefly suggested that a particularist response to the problem of the criterion may be put to good use against epistemic relativism.
Keywords epistemic relativism  Pyrrhonian scepticism  problem of the criterion  particularism
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DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2011.09.012
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References found in this work BETA

The Value of a Fixed Methodology. [REVIEW]John Worrall - 1988 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (2):263-275.
Fix It and Be Damned: A Reply to Laudan.John Worrall - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (3):376-388.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Relativism.Maria Baghramian & Adam J. Carter - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Epistemic Relativism, Scepticism, Pluralism.Martin Kusch - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4687-4703.
De-Idealizing Disagreement, Rethinking Relativism.Katherina Kinzel & Martin Kusch - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (1):40-71.
Relativism.Chris Swoyer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Scepticism, Relativism and the Argument From the Criterion.Howard Sankey - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):182-190.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

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