Epistemic Truth in a Plurality of Worlds

Logica Trianguli 4:53-67 (2000)
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Abstract

Both Charles S. Peirce and Edmund Husserl have agreed with the need for distinguishing two kinds of objects in referential direction. Dynamical Object and Immediate Object, in Peirce’s words. And the object “as a simple noematic object” and the object “as expressed by its determinations”, in Husserl’s words. Based on a very similar distinction, a double notion of the world is elaborated in this article. One notion constituted by objects as conceptualized objects that turns into the different languages used by humans in conceptualization of world. And the other constituted by objects as the determinable objects, the objects as the “supports” of all possible conceptualizations of them. Taking that distinction as a basis, a criterion of truth for perception statements belonging to every language in which the world or conceptualized worlds are expressed, is proposed in the last part of this paper

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