Feyerabend and the Description Theory of Reference

Abstract
In his early work Feyerabend argues that certain theories are incommensurable due to semantic variance. In this paper it is argued that Feyerabend relies on a description theory of reference in the course of his argument for incommensurability and in his analysis of the relevant kind of semantic variance. Against this it is objected that such reliance on the description theory eliminates ostensive reference determination and obscures the presence of theoretical conflict
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 1053-8364
DOI 10.5840/jpr_1991_33
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