Fitch's Paradox and the Problem of Shared Content

Abstracta 3 (1):74-86 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX


According to the “paradox of knowability”, the moderate thesis that all truths are knowable – ... – implies the seemingly preposterous claim that all truths are actually known – ... –, i.e. that we are omniscient. If Fitch’s argument were successful, it would amount to a knockdown rebuttal of anti-realism by reductio. In the paper I defend the nowadays rather neglected strategy of intuitionistic revisionism. Employing only intuitionistically acceptable rules of inference, the conclusion of the argument is, firstly, not ..., but .... Secondly, even if there were an intuitionistically acceptable proof of ..., i.e. an argument based on a different set of premises, the conclusion would have to be interpreted in accordance with Heyting semantics, and read in this way, the apparently preposterous conclusion would be true on conceptual grounds and acceptable even from a realist point of view. Fitch’s argument, understood as an immanent critique of verificationism, fails because in a debate dealing with the justification of deduction there can be no interpreted formal language on which realists and anti-realists could agree. Thus, the underlying problem is that a satisfactory solution to the “problem of shared content” is not available. I conclude with some remarks on the proposals by J. Salerno and N. Tennant to reconstruct certain arguments in the debate on anti-realism by establishing aporias.



External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Fitch's Paradox of Knowability.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2010 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Truth and the Enigma of Knowability.Bernhard Weiss - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (4):521-537.
Truth and the enigma of knowability.Bernhard Weiss - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (4):521–537.
Knowability and Constructivism.Timothy Williamson - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (53):422-432.
Analogues of knowability.David DeVidi & Tim Kenyon - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):481 – 495.


Added to PP

270 (#76,157)

6 months
59 (#80,941)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Thorsten Sander
University of Duisburg-Essen

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Elements of Intuitionism.Michael Dummett - 1977 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Roberto Minio.
The taming of the true.Neil Tennant - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Realism, Meaning and Truth.Crispin Wright - 1986 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.

View all 35 references / Add more references