Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability and the Knower Paradox: Against a Proposed Dialetheist Unified Solution

Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 73 (3-4):1001-1020 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

After introducing Fitch’s paradox of knowability and the knower paradox, the paper critically discusses the dialetheist unified solution to both problems that Beall and Priest have proposed. It is first argued that the dialetheist approach to the knower paradox can withstand the main objections against it, these being that the approach entails an understanding of negation that is intolerably weak and that it commits dialetheists to jointly accept and reject the same thing. The lesson of the knower paradox, according to dialetheism, is that human knowledge is inconsistent. The paper also argues that this inconsistency has not been shown by dialetheists to be wide enough in its scope to justify their approach to Fitch’s problem. The connection between the two problems is superficial and therefore the proposed unified solution fails.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,442

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Fitch's proof, verificationism, and the knower paradox.J. C. Beall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):241 – 247.
Knowability and the capacity to know.Michael Fara - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):53 - 73.
New Essays on the Knowability Paradox.Joe Salerno (ed.) - 2008 - Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-01-19

Downloads
29 (#405,458)

6 months
1 (#454,876)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ricardo Santos
Universidade de Lisboa

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

A logical analysis of some value concepts.Frederic Fitch - 1963 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 28 (2):135-142.
A paradox regained.D. Kaplan & R. Montague - 1960 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 1 (3):79-90.
Refutation by elimination.John Turri - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):35-39.

View all 6 references / Add more references