Kim�s toppling house of cards: An argument against the �micro-based property� solution
Abstractof (from British Columbia Philosophy Graduate Conference) In response to the “Causal Drainage” objection to his Supervenience Argument, Kim introduces micro-based properties and argues that their presence prohibits any causal drainage between metaphysical levels. Noordhof disagrees and instead argues that the causal powers of the �micro-bases� of micro-based properties seem to preempt the causal powers of micro-based properties, in much the same way as Kim claims the powers of subvening base properties preempt the powers of supervenient properties. Thus Noordhof argues that the causal powers of higher-level micro-based properties still seem to drain downward to their lower-level micro-bases. In this paper I will defend Noordhof and argue that in fact this drainage is due to the fact that micro-based properties seem to supervene on their micro-bases. I thus argue that micro-based properties fall victim to the very same Supervenience Argument that Kim himself presents and I conclude that even micro-based properties turn out to be causally impotent if Kim�s Supervenience Argument is sound.
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