Methodological Incommensurability and Epistemic Relativism

Topoi 32 (1):33-41 (2013)
Abstract
This paper revisits one of the key ideas developed in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In particular, it explores the methodological form of incommensurability which may be found in the original edition of Structure. It is argued that such methodological incommensurability leads to a form of epistemic relativism. In later work, Kuhn moved away from the original idea of methodological incommensurability with his idea of a set of epistemic values that provides a basis for rational theory choice, but do not constitute an algorithm for such choice. The paper also explores the sceptical basis for the epistemic relativism of the original view that Kuhn proposes in Structure. It suggests that the main sceptical rationale for such relativism may be avoided by a particularist and naturalist conception of epistemic normativity. When this approach is combined with the appeal to external methodological standards endorsed by the later Kuhn and his critics, the epistemic relativism of Structure may be completely repudiated
Keywords Methodological incommensurability  Epistemic relativism  Pyrrhonian scepticism  Particularism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11245-012-9139-6
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,169
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
Against Method.Paul Feyerabend - 1975 - London: New Left Books.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Relativism, Particularism and Reflective Equilibrium.Howard Sankey - 2014 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (2):281-292.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Scepticism, Relativism and the Argument From the Criterion.Howard Sankey - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):182-190.
Epistemic Relativism and the Problem of the Criterion.Howard Sankey - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (4):562-570.
Seemingly Similar Beliefs: A Case Study on Relativistic Research Practices.I. Koskinen - 2011 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (1):84-110.
Epistemological Relativism in its Latest Form.Harvey Siegel - 1980 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):107 – 117.
Kuhn's Epistemological Relativism: An Interpretation and Defense.Gerald Doppelt - 1978 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 21 (1-4):33 – 86.
Kuhn's Changing Concept of Incommensurability.Howard Sankey - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (4):759-774.
Epistemic Relativism.Steven Luper - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):271–295.
Defusing Epistemic Relativism.Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Synthese 166 (2):397-412.
In Defense of Epistemic Relativism.Ram Neta - 2007 - Episteme 4 (1):30-48.
The Trivial Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism. Or How I Learned to Stop Caring About Truth.Berit Brogaard - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & D. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press.
Added to PP index
2012-10-19

Total downloads
178 ( #26,376 of 2,192,005 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #42,191 of 2,192,005 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature