Authors
Howard Sankey
University of Melbourne
Abstract
This is a reply to Alex Grzankowski’s comment on my paper, ‘To Believe is to Believe True’. I argue that one may believe a proposition to be true without possessing the concept of truth. I note that to believe the proposition P to be true is not the same as to believe the proposition ‘P is true’. This avoids the regress highlighted by Grzankowski in which the concept of truth is employed an infinite number of times in a single belief.
Keywords Belief  Truth  Believing true  Grzankowski
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Reprint years 2019
DOI 10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n2p361
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References found in this work BETA

To Believe is to Believe True.Howard Sankey - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (1):131-136.
To Believe Is Not To Believe True: Reply to Sankey.Alex Grzankowski - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology (1):137-138.

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Citations of this work BETA

Believing That P Requires Taking It to Be the Case That P: A Reply to Grzankowski and Sankey.James Simpson - 2020 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 24 (1):233-237.

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