Nostalgia for the ordinary: Comments on papers by Unger and Wheeler

Synthese 41 (2):175 - 184 (1979)

David Sanford
Duke University
Unger claims that we can block sorites arguments for the conclusion that there are no ordinary things only by invoking some kind of miracle, but no such miracle is needed if we reject the principle that every statement has a truth value. Wheeler's argument for the nonexistence of ordinary things depends on the assumptions that if ordinary things exist, they comprise real kinds, and that if ordinary predicates really apply to things, the predicates refer to real properties. If we accept Wheeler's criteria for the reality of kinds and properties, we have no good reason to accept these assumptions.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00869570
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References found in this work BETA

There Are No Ordinary Things.Peter Unger - 1979 - Synthese 41 (2):117 - 154.
On That Which is Not.Samuel C. Wheeler - 1979 - Synthese 41 (2):155 - 173.
Negative Terms.David Sanford - 1967 - Erkenntnis 27 (6):201.

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Citations of this work BETA

Ordinary Objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Vague Numbers.David H. Sanford - 2002 - Acta Analytica 17 (2):63-73.
Sorites.Bertil Rolf - 1984 - Synthese 58 (2):219 - 250.

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