Philosophical Review 125 (1):35-82 (2016)

Authors
Paolo Santorio
University of Maryland, College Park
Abstract
Know-how and expressivism are usually regarded as disjoint topics, belonging to distant areas of philosophy. This paper argues that, despite obvious differences, the two debates have important similarities. In particular, semantic and conceptual tools developed by expressivists can be exported to the know-how debate. On the one hand, some of the expressivists' semantic resources can be used to deflect Stanley and Williamson's influential argument for factualism about know-how: the claim that knowing how to do something consists in knowing a fact. On the other, expressivism provides the resources to formulate a nonfactualist account of know-how. On this account, know-how has a kind of nonpropositional content and plays the role of guiding performance of action, rather than recording information from the environment
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-3321721
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References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Lowenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Knowing How.Yuri Cath - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):487-503.
Joint Know-How.Jonathan Birch - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3329–3352.
Knowledge How.Jeremy Fantl - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A User’s Guide to Hybrid Tools.Caleb Perl - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):129-158.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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