On Free Will and No-conspiracy

In Tilman Sauer & Adrian Wüthrich (eds.), New Vistas on Old Problems. Max Planck Research Library for the History and Development of Knowledge. pp. 87-102 (2013)
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Abstract

In this paper, I challenge the widespread view that Measurement Independence adequately represents the requirement that EPR experimenters have free will. Measurement Independence is most commonly taken as a necessary condition for free will. A number of implicit assumptions can be identified in this regard, all of which can be challenged on their own grounds. As a result, I conclude that Measurement Independence-type conditions are not to be justified by appealing to the preservation of the EPR experimenters’ free will.

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Iñaki San Pedro
Complutense University of Madrid

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References found in this work

Time’s arrow and Archimedes’ point.Huw Price - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):1093-1096.
Philoophical Consequences of Quantum Theory.James T. Cushing & Ernan McMullin (eds.) - 1989 - University of Notre Dame Press.
The Free Will Theorem.John Conway & Simon Kochen - 2006 - Foundations of Physics 36 (10):1441-1473.

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