Erkenntnis 84 (4):861-875 (2019)

Authors
Alexander Sandgren
Umeå University
Abstract
This paper concerns Kripke’s puzzle about belief. I have two goals in this paper. The first is to argue that two leading approaches to Kripke’s puzzle, those of Lewis and Chalmers, are inadequate as they stand. Both approaches require the world to supply an object that the relevant intentional attitudes pick out. The problem is that there are cases which, I argue, exhibit the very same puzzling phenomenon in which the world does not supply an object in the required way. The second goal is to draw out a more general lesson about Kripke’s puzzle. I argue that Kripke’s puzzle should be understood as intimately related to a phenomenon known as ‘intentional identity’, and that an adequate account of Kripke’s puzzle should be extensible to cases in which the relevant attitudes are empty.
Keywords Kripke's puzzle about belief  David Lewis  David Chalmers  Empty names  Intentional Identity
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-018-9984-9
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Aboutness.Stephen Yablo - 2014 - Princeton University Press.
On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 1905 - Mind 14 (56):479-493.
On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 2005 - Mind 114 (456):873 - 887.

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Citations of this work BETA

Turning Aboutness About.Alexander Sandgren - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
Private Investigators and Public Speakers.Alexander Sandgren - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.

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