Realism, Progress and the Historical Turn

Foundations of Science 22 (1):201-214 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX


The contemporary debate between scientific realism and anti-realism is conditioned by a polarity between two opposing arguments: the realist’s success argument and the anti-realist’s pessimistic induction. This polarity has skewed the debate away from the problem that lies at the source of the debate. From a realist point of view, the historical approach to the philosophy of science which came to the fore in the 1960s gave rise to an unsatisfactory conception of scientific progress. One of the main motivations for the scientific realist appeal to the success of science was the need to provide a substantive account of the progress of science as an increase of knowledge about the same entities as those referred to by earlier theories in the history of science. But the idea that a substantive conception of progress requires continuity of reference has faded from the contemporary debate. In this paper, I revisit the historical movement in the philosophy of science in an attempt to resuscitate the original agenda of the debate about scientific realism. I also briefly outline the way in which the realist should employ the theory of reference as the basis for a robust account of scientific progress which will satisfy realist requirements.

Similar books and articles

Does Scientific Realism Matter?Carl Alan Matheson - 1986 - Dissertation, Syracuse University
Re-enchanting Realism in Debate with Kyle Stanford.Emma Ruttkamp-Bloem - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (1):201-224.
Three Paradigms of Scientific Realism: A Truthmaking Account.Jamin Asay - 2013 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):1-21.
A confutation of convergent realism.Larry Laudan - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.
Science and Reality.Jan Faye - 2006 - In H. B. Andersen, F. V. Christiansen, K. F. Jørgensen & Vincent Hendriccks (eds.), The Way Through Science and Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Stig Andur Pedersen. College Publications. pp. 137-170.
Progress and Truth in Science.Kenneth Wayne Goodman - 1991 - Dissertation, University of Miami
Realism, Anti-Realism, and the Success of Science.David Marcus Shein - 2002 - Dissertation, City University of New York
Scientific progress without increasing verisimilitude: In response to Niiniluoto.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 51:100-104.
Reference failure and scientific realism: A response to the meta-induction.D. Cummiskey - 1992 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (1):21-40.
Scientific Virtues: An Introduction to Diachronic Realism.Doren A. Recker - 1983 - Dissertation, The University of Oklahoma


Added to PP

470 (#41,633)

6 months
105 (#42,541)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Howard Sankey
University of Melbourne

References found in this work

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Ian Hacking.
Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The Structure of Science.Ernest Nagel - 1961 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):275-275.

View all 18 references / Add more references