Tarskian truth and the two provinces of semantics
Disputatio 1 (16):26-37 (2004)
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that the cleavage between the theory of reference and the theory of meaning, which under the influence of Quine has dominated a large part of the philosophy of language of the last fifty years, is based on a misrepresentation of Tarski's achievement and on an overestimation of the scope and value of disquotation. In particular, I show that, if we accept Davidson's critique of disquotation, the same kind of reasons that Quine offered in opposition to the Carnapian theory of meaning also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the Tarskian theory of reference.Author's Profile
DOI
10.2478/disp-2004-0002
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Citations of this work
Human, machines, and the interpretation of formal systems.Porfírio Silva - 2016 - AI and Society 31 (2):157-169.
References found in this work
The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.