Disputatio 1 (16):26-37 (2004)

Ricardo Santos
Universidade de Lisboa
In this paper, I argue that the cleavage between the theory of reference and the theory of meaning, which under the influence of Quine has dominated a large part of the philosophy of language of the last fifty years, is based on a misrepresentation of Tarski's achievement and on an overestimation of the scope and value of disquotation. In particular, I show that, if we accept Davidson's critique of disquotation, the same kind of reasons that Quine offered in opposition to the Carnapian theory of meaning also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the Tarskian theory of reference.
Keywords truth  meaning  reference  Tarski  Quine
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2478/disp-2004-0002
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Upload history
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Understanding Truth.Scott Soames - 1998 - Oxford University Press USA.
Truth and the Absence of Fact.Hartry Field - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
The Semantic Conception of Truth.Alfred Tarski - 1999 - In Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons (eds.), Truth. Oxford University Press.
Truth and Other Enigmas.Michael Dummett - 1981 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (4):419-425.
Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence.John Etchemendy - 1988 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (1):51-79.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
148 ( #59,301 of 2,331,392 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
42 ( #14,164 of 2,331,392 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes