Sherrilyn Roush: Tracking truth: Knowledge, evidence, and science [Book Review]

Review of Metaphysics 61 (1):158-159 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This book is a comprehensive defence of a modified Nozickian tracking account of knowledge. The account is presented as an analysis of knowledge, rather than justification. Roush allows that a tracking analysis of justification may be possible. But she denies that justification is required for knowledge. Her view is externalist, but not reliabilist.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Recursive tracking versus process reliabilism.Alvin I. Goldman - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):223-230.
Précis of tracking truth.Sherrilyn Roush - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):213-222.
Perceptual knowledge derailed.Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (1):31-45.
Tracking truth: knowledge, evidence, and science.Sherrilyn Roush - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
111 (#155,802)

6 months
37 (#95,960)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Howard Sankey
University of Melbourne

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references