Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica (2015)

Authors
Ricardo Santos
Universidade de Lisboa
Abstract
Most words in natural language are vague, that is to say, they lack sharp boundaries and, hence, they have (actual or potential) borderline cases, where the word in question neither definitely applies nor definitely fails to apply. Vagueness gives rise to paradoxes, the best known of which is the sorites (concerned with how many grains of sand are needed to make a heap). Besides offering a solution to such paradoxes, a theory of vagueness should systematically describe how the truth conditions of sentences with vague terms are determined; and it should also define the right logical principles for reasoning with such sentences. This article offers an introduction to the main theories of vagueness and to the problems they have to face.
Keywords sharp boundaries  borderline cases  sorites paradox  bivalence  truth-functionality
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References found in this work BETA

Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - Routledge.
Vagueness, Truth and Logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
Theories of Vagueness.Rosanna Keefe - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
Wang's Paradox.Michael Dummett - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):201--32.

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