Whistleblowing and Complicity in Normative Theorizing on Political Corruption

European Journal of Political Theory (forthcoming)
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In their work “Political Corruption: The Internal Enemy of Public Institutions,” Ceva and Ferretti defend a conception of corruption as a breach of the duty of accountability for officeholders. I address two key aspects of their proposal. First, I contend that whistleblowing disclosures should be limited to acts of last resort, rather than as a common practice of ensuring answerability. Second, I argue that their account does not adequately distinguish between degrees of involvement in corrupt activities. Within hierarchical organizations, not all officeholders possess the same capacity and power to counteract unjust practices. Different contributory roles entail varying degrees of responsibility within the normative structure of answerability defended by the authors.



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Daniele Santoro
Universidade do Minho

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