Consciousness and numerical identity

Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):107-117 (1979)
This article criticizes the thesis, Suggested by wittgenstein and elaborated and defended by malcolm and others, That the concepts of numerical identity and difference do not apply to pains, Afterimages, Sudden thoughts, And other contents of consciousness. I argue that the arguments offered in support of this thesis cannot account for much of our common practice and language concerning these contents while acknowledging that these categories apply to these contents can account for these practices and language as well as for the examples malcolm emphasizes. On the basis of this analysis I draw some conclusions about the relation of ordinary language to common sense
Keywords Consciousness  Identity  Metaphysics  Malcolm, N
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DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1979.tb00228.x
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