Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):107-117 (1979)
This article criticizes the thesis, Suggested by wittgenstein and elaborated and defended by malcolm and others, That the concepts of numerical identity and difference do not apply to pains, Afterimages, Sudden thoughts, And other contents of consciousness. I argue that the arguments offered in support of this thesis cannot account for much of our common practice and language concerning these contents while acknowledging that these categories apply to these contents can account for these practices and language as well as for the examples malcolm emphasizes. On the basis of this analysis I draw some conclusions about the relation of ordinary language to common sense
|Keywords||Consciousness Identity Metaphysics Malcolm, N|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Personal Identity and Self as Narrative : Formal Identity and Narrative Identity as Two Essential Building Blocks in the Constitution of Self.Gerard P. Montague - unknown
Consciousness and Connectionism--The Problem of Compatability of Type Identity Theory and of Connectionism.Matjaz Potrc - 1995 - Acta Analytica 13 (13):175-190.
Comments on Some Aspects of Peter Unger's Identity, Consciousness and Value.Peter F. Strawson - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):145-148.
Experience, Agency, and Personal Identity.Marya Schechtman - 2005 - Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):1-24.
Professor Malcolm on "Scientific Materialism and the Identity Theory".Ernest Sosa - 1965 - Dialogue 4 (4):422-23.
Coconsciousness and Numerical Identity of the Person.Susan L. Anderson - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (July):1-10.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads13 ( #357,701 of 2,178,151 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #316,504 of 2,178,151 )
How can I increase my downloads?