Acta Analytica 21 (40):41-73 (2006)
The acquisition of concepts has proven especially difficult for philosophers and psychologists to explain. In this paper, I examine Jerry Fodor’s most recent attempt to explain the acquisition of concepts relative to experiences of their referents. In reevaluating his earlier position, Fodor attempts to co-opt informational semantics into an account of concept acquisition that avoids the radical nativism of his earlier views. I argue that Fodor’s attempts ultimately fail to be persuasive. He must either accept his earlier nativism or adopt a rational causal model of concept acquisition. His animus towards the latter dictates, in my view, a return to the nativism with which he began.
|Keywords||Acquisition Concept Metaphysics Nativism Representation Fodor, Jerry A|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Acquiring a New Concept is Not Explicable-by-Content.Nicholas Shea - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3):148 - 149.
Learning Matters: The Role of Learning in Concept Acquisition.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (5):507-539.
Epistemic Boundedness and the Universality of Thought.Matthew Rellihan - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 125 (2):219-250.
Review of What's Within? Nativism Reconsidered. [REVIEW]Steven Gross - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (1):91-94.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads64 ( #81,391 of 2,163,870 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #188,913 of 2,163,870 )
How can I increase my downloads?