Acta Analytica 21 (40):41-73 (2006)

Authors
John Sarnecki
University of Toledo
Abstract
The acquisition of concepts has proven especially difficult for philosophers and psychologists to explain. In this paper, I examine Jerry Fodor’s most recent attempt to explain the acquisition of concepts relative to experiences of their referents. In reevaluating his earlier position, Fodor attempts to co-opt informational semantics into an account of concept acquisition that avoids the radical nativism of his earlier views. I argue that Fodor’s attempts ultimately fail to be persuasive. He must either accept his earlier nativism or adopt a rational causal model of concept acquisition. His animus towards the latter dictates, in my view, a return to the nativism with which he began.
Keywords Acquisition  Concept  Metaphysics  Nativism  Representation  Fodor, Jerry A
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-006-1009-7
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References found in this work BETA

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.

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Innate Mind Need Not Be Within.Riin Kõiv - 2020 - Acta Analytica (1):1-21.
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